This seems to be part of a general trend of taking a broad view of "signature" in e-contexts so long as there is adequate evidence that the mark of assent was genuine - similar to
Bassano
v Toft [2014] EWHC 377 (QB) (paras 39-46) , where clicking on an "I Agree" button was also held to be a 'signature'. Wisely, the judges concerned define the principle in vague terms, in the hope that it will still apply even if the technology develops
in unexpected directions (as no doubt it will).
From: Matthew P. Harrington <matthew.p.harrington@umontreal.ca>
Sent: Thursday, August 5, 2021 2:12 PM
To: obligations@uwo.ca <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Is a text message a signature?
For those who maintain casebooks or other course materials, there is a recent Ontario case (Divisional Court) on whether a text message can constitute a signature. It arises in the context
of a statute of limitations defence, but the principles seem applicable to contract or other contexts. It’s a nice, short exposition of the problem and why a text should be considered a signature in certain cases (see paras 42-50). The question of authenticity
was solved not only by the fact that the text bore the telephone number of the sender, but also the “International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) number” was also embedded in the data of text itself and provides a unique digital signature for every phone.